In a significant development for privacy jurisprudence in India, the Delhi High Court has formally recognised the Right to be Forgotten as an integral part of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In the case of Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v Union of India and Connected Matters, the Court considered multiple petitions bearing a common concern, arising from the advent of the digital era, namely, the permanent online availability of judicial records and the lasting impact such accessibility can have on an individual’s reputation, dignity and ability to move on from past disputes.

The judgment consolidates many petitions filed by individuals with varied backgrounds, including persons who have been acquitted of criminal charges, parties to matrimonial disputes, individuals whose names appeared incidentally in judicial records, amongst others. The Court was called upon to reconcile competing constitutional values with the right to privacy and dignity on the one hand and the principles of open justice, freedom of speech and the public’s right to know on the other.

The Court observed that while judicial proceedings and records are generally public in nature, the ease with which search engines can retrieve information decades after a dispute has concluded can result in disproportionate and continuing harm to individuals. Recognising this reality, the Court sought to strike a balance between the constitutional principles of privacy and open justice.

 Right to be Forgotten is not a Right to Erase History

A significant facet of the judgment is the Court’s clarification that the Right to be Forgotten does not allow individuals to rewrite or erase the past. Judicial records continue to remain part of the public record and are not required to be deleted. Instead, the right is aimed at limiting the unnecessary and perpetual digital exposure of information where continued accessibility serves little legitimate public purpose and disproportionately affects an individual’s privacy interests.

The Court emphasised that every claim must be assessed by balancing competing interests, including the right to privacy, freedom of speech and expression, press freedom, the principle of open justice and the public’s right to access information.

De-Indexing as the Preferred Remedy

The Court noted that rather than directing the removal of judgments from court websites or legal databases, de-indexing should be the preferred remedy in appropriate cases. Under this approach, search engines may be directed to prevent a judgment or judicial record from appearing in search results generated through a person’s name or other identifying particulars. The underlying record remains available and accessible through conventional legal databases/research methods, thereby ensuring transparency while reducing unwarranted reputational harm. The Court further recognised that, in suitable circumstances, the masking or anonymisation of personal identifiers in publicly accessible versions of judicial records may be an appropriate measure.

When May Relief be Granted?

The judgment provides guidance on situations where de-indexing or anonymisation may be warranted. These include cases involving acquittals, discharge from criminal proceedings, quashing of criminal cases, settlement of disputes, matrimonial and family law matters or situations where an individual is only incidentally referred to in a judicial record. The Court noted that such relief may be justified where the continued online accessibility of information no longer serves a meaningful public interest but continues to adversely affect the concerned individual.

A Case-by-Case Assessment

The Court recognised that requests for de-indexing can arise in a wide variety of circumstances and therefore refrained from adopting a rigid formula for determining when relief should be granted. Instead, it identified several factors that courts should consider inter alia including the nature of the information involved, the time elapsed since its publication, the individual’s role in public life, the accuracy and completeness of the information and the extent of any resulting harm to the person’s dignity, reputation or autonomy. Importantly, these factors are not to be used as a checklist and rather must be weighed holistically, with the outcome ultimately depending on the specific facts and circumstances of each case and whether continued public accessibility of the information remains justified.

Public Interest- A Key Consideration

Notably, the Court affirmed that the Right to be Forgotten is not an absolute right. Relief may be refused where disclosure continues to serve a significant public interest. This may include cases involving serious criminal offences, offences against women or children, matters concerning public officials or public figures, issues involving public accountability or circumstances where continued access to information is necessary for historical, journalistic, research or legal purposes.

Court’s Final Ruling

Applying the principles formulated, the Court granted relief in several petitions involving acquittals, discharges, quashed proceedings, settlements and private matrimonial disputes. In such cases, it directed search engines and legal databases to de-index relevant judgments, orders and related content from name-based search results. In certain matters, the Court also recognised the appropriateness of masking identities in judicial records.

However, the Court declined relief in cases where the petitioners sought to remove references to serious criminal convictions or matters involving ongoing and substantial public interest. It emphasised that the Right to be Forgotten cannot be used as a mechanism to erase legitimate public records or avoid accountability for established misconduct.

Court Steps in Amid Legislative Silence

A noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the Court’s recognition that India currently lacks a dedicated statutory framework governing the Right to be Forgotten. While the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 introduces certain rights relating to the erasure of personal data, it does not comprehensively address the complex questions that arise when privacy interests intersect with publicly accessible court records. Faced with this legislative vacuum, the Court placed reliance on the case of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan¹ and noted that “where a legislative vacuum exists and fundamental rights are at stake, Constitutional Courts are not merely empowered but duty-bound to step in. This Court is thus, not legislating, but applying constitutional principles to fill in a gap that the legislature has not yet addressed.” The judgment therefore represents an exercise of the Court’s constitutional responsibility to protect individual rights while simultaneously preserving competing public interests such as transparency, freedom of expression and the principle of open justice.

Practical Implications

The judgment is one of the most comprehensive judicial pronouncements on the Right to be Forgotten in India and establishes a structured framework for courts dealing with requests for de-indexing and anonymisation of judicial records. It acknowledges that while transparency remains a cornerstone of the justice system, privacy and dignity cannot be overlooked in an era where information can remain permanently searchable online.

Humans forget but the internet does not forget and the internet does not let humans forget.

By recognising that individuals should not be indefinitely burdened by past legal proceedings that have lost their public significance, the Delhi High Court has taken an important step towards aligning India’s privacy framework with the realities of the digital age as well as international standards.

Endnotes:

^[1] (1997) 6 SCC 241